Policy and Governance

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science. Please check back later for the full article.

Fragile states have historically experienced a disproportionate amount of natural disaster-related losses. For example, from 2005 to 2009 more than 50% of those impacted by a natural disaster lived in a fragile state, resulting in over $200 billion in combined losses. Despite myriad descriptions and indicators used to define a fragile state, there is consensus across the international community that a fragile state can be described as lacking the ability to maintain physical control of territorial boundaries, provide basic public services, and facilitate economic growth. When natural disasters occur in such areas, they exacerbate already weak governance structures and further undermine their governments’ capability to respond to the crisis while simultaneously addressing challenges related to poverty and conflict. To remedy these and other complex issues inherent in fragile states, policymakers are beginning to recognize the importance of effective agency coordination and cross-sector collaboration. Agency coordination, in the context of natural disaster response, can be described as the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, and communication by public agencies for supporting incident response activities. Cross-sector collaboration can be defined as the sharing of information and resources by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve an outcome that cannot be achieved by organizations in one sector alone. Such organizational sectors include government, businesses, nonprofits, communities, and the public. Because forecasts suggest that natural disaster-related losses will only increase in fragile states due to population growth, urbanization, and climate change, there is a pressing need to understand the ways public organizations not only coordinate before, during, and after a natural disaster, but also how they collaborate across organizational sectors.

Community-based approaches existed even before the existence of the state and its formal governance structure. People and communities used to help and take care of each other’s disaster needs. However, due to the evolution of state governance, new terminology of community-based disaster risk reduction (CBDRR) has been coined to help communities in an organized way. Different stakeholders are responsible for community-based actions; the two key players are the local governments and civil society, or nongovernment organizations. Private sector and academic and research institutions also play crucial roles in CBDRR. Many innovative CBDRR practices exist in the world, and it is important to analyze them and learn the common lessons. The key to community is its diversity, and this should be kept in mind for the CBDRR. There are different entry points and change agents based on the diverse community. It is important to identify the right change agent and entry point and to develop a sustainable mechanism to institutionalize CBDRR activities. Social networking needs to be incorporated for effective CBDRR.

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science. Please check back later for the full article.

While known to be important and essential for improved effectiveness and efficiency, cross-sector coordination and collaboration between different actors engaged in post-disaster recovery is fraught with complications. Among the challenges are: who leads and how; the capacity and roles of the host government; governance structures within organizations (which may differ a great deal); assumptions of power; trade-offs between valuing relationships and “getting the job done”; and the varying constraints (and opportunities) of accountability.

Recognizing the need to improve joint actions for a better response, the Humanitarian Reform Agenda (HRA), begun in 2005, led to the remolding of collective models of disaster response and the adoption of the global cluster system, essentially organized around the delivery of goods and services (sectors) by traditional aid actors (the United Nations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement).

While the cluster system has largely been acknowledged as an improvement in collaboration between actors, a perennial challenge of cross-sector coordination remains. One of the opportunities for improvement lies in better and more predictable leadership, one of the key areas identified by the HRA. Another opportunity lies in changing the focus away from a supply-driven approach of prioritizing what aid providers deliver towards a demand-driven understanding, such as that offered by area-based approaches, wherein sectors are more closely aligned.

A common form of collaboration within aid is partnership between various actors (e.g., the UN, NGOs). Partnerships assume a relationship that is more than a constructing relationship: effective partnerships emphasize the need for transparency and equity alongside being results-oriented and competent. Recognizing this, The Grand Bargain, resulting from the World Humanitarian Summit, noted that aid providers should “engage with local and national responders in a spirit of partnership and aim to reinforce rather than replace local and national capacities”.

Partnerships, however, fall short all too often, especially when one partner has power over the other, which is often the case. The report Time to Let Go, from the think-tank the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) notes, for instance that, “the relationships between donor and implementer, aid provider and recipient, remain controlling and asymmetrical, and partnerships and interactions remain transactional and competitive, rather than reciprocal and collective.” The challenge remains to achieve the task in hand while at the same time engaging in effective collaborative mechanisms that value the nature of the relationship. If this is not achieved, effective post-disaster recovery can be jeopardized.

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science. Please check back later for the full article.

As with countless other policy areas, natural hazard policy can be viewed as a jurisdictional competition between executive and legislative branches. While policymaking supremacy is delegated to the legislative branch in constitutional democracies, the power over implementation, budgeting, and grant-making that executive agencies enjoy means that the executive branch wields considerable influence over outcomes in natural hazards policymaking. The rules that govern federal implementation of complex legislative policies put the implementing agency at the center of influence over how policy priorities play out in local, county, and state processes before, during, and after disasters hit.

Examples abound related to this give-and-take between the legislative and executive functions of government within the hazards and disaster realm, but none more telling than the changes made to U.S. disaster policy after September 11. The competition and potential for mismatch between legislative and executive priorities has been heightened since the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was reorganized under the Department of Homeland Security. While this may appear uniquely American, the primacy of terrorism and other security-related threats not only dwarfs natural hazards issues in the United States but also globally. Among the most professionalized and powerful natural hazards and disaster agencies prior to 9/11, FEMA has seen its influence diminished and its access to decision makers reduced.

This picture of legislative and executive actors within the natural hazards policy domain who compete for supremacy goes beyond the role of FEMA and post-9/11 policy. Power dynamics associated with budgets, political influence, and relative power among executive agencies are on-going issues important to understanding this competition for policy influence as natural hazards policy competes for attention, funding, and power among within the broader domain of security policy.

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science. Please check back later for the full article.

Natural disasters cause massive social disruptions and can lead to tremendous economic and human losses. Given their uncertain and destructive nature, disasters invariably induce significant governmental responses and typically pose severe financial challenges for jurisdictions across all levels of government. From a public finance perspective, disasters cause governments to incur additional spending on various emergency management activities; by disrupting normal business activities, they also affect tax base robustness and cause revenue losses. The question is: how significant are these fiscal effects, and how do they affect hazards governance more generally? Understanding the fiscal implications of natural disasters is essential to evaluating the size of the economic costs of disasters as well as to forecasting governments’ financial exposure to future shocks. Furthermore, how disaster costs are shared among different levels of government is another important question concerning the intergovernmental dynamics of disaster management.

In the U.S. federal system, the direct fiscal costs of natural disasters (i.e., increased government expenditures due to disaster shocks) are largely borne by the federal government. It is estimated that Hurricane Katrina cost the federal government approximately $120 billion, while Hurricane Sandy cost $60 billion. Even in the years without large-scale disaster events, federal disaster spending is between $2 billion and $6 billion annually. Under the Stafford Act, the federal government plays a critical role in funding disaster-related programs (for example, direct relief, mitigation grants, and subsidized insurance programs) and in redistributing the actual costs of natural hazards, meaning that a considerable portion of the local disaster burden is shifted to U.S. taxpayers. This raises a set of issues concerning the equity and efficiency of the U.S. disaster policy framework.

Managing disasters involves multi-phased activities to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disaster shocks. There is a common belief that the federal government inappropriately spends far more on ex post disaster response, relief, and recovery than what it spends on ex ante mitigation and preparedness, often driven by political motivations (e.g., meeting voter’s preference for post-disaster aid) and the current budget rules. As pointed out by others, federal disaster relief and assistance distort the subnational incentive to invest in local disaster prevention and mitigation efforts. Furthermore, given the mounting evidence on the cost-effectiveness of disaster mitigation programs in reducing future disaster damages, the current practice of focusing resources on post-disaster assistance means substantial public welfare losses. In recent years, there has been a call for the federal government to shift its disaster policy emphasis toward mitigation and preparedness and to facilitate local efforts on mitigation. To achieve the goal requires a comprehensive reform in government budgeting for emergency management.

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science. Please check back later for the full article.

The second priority of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 stresses that, to efficiently manage risk posed by hazards, disaster risk governance should be strengthened for all phases of the disaster cycle. Disaster management should be based on adequate strategies and plans, guidance, and inter-sector coordination and communication, as well as on participation and inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, including the general public. Hazards that occur with little or no warning challenge these efforts.

Different types of hazards present different challenges to societies in terms of detection, monitoring and early warning (and then response and recovery). For example, some hazards occur suddenly with little or no warning (e.g., earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, snow avalanches, flash floods, etc.), whereas others are slow-onset (e.g., drought and desertification). Hazards such as hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, and floods can unfold at a pace that affords decision makers and emergency managers time to affect warnings and undertake preparedness and mitigative activities. Others do not. Detection and monitoring technologies (e.g., seismometers, stream gauges, meteorological forecasting equipment) and early warning systems (e.g., the Australian Tsunami Warning System) have been developed for a number of hazard types, however, their reliability and effectiveness vary with the phenomenon and its location. For example, tsunamis generated by submarine landslides occur without warning, generally rendering tsunami warning systems inadequate.

The lack of reliable and timely warnings has serious implications for risk governance processes and practices. To manage events with short or no notice, emphasis should be given to the preparedness and mitigation phase of disaster planning, and in particular, to efforts to engage and educate the public. Risk and vulnerability assessment is also of paramount importance. The identification of especially vulnerable groups, appropriate land use planning, the introduction and enforcement of building codes, and reinforcement regulations can all help reduce casualties and damage to the built environment caused by unexpected events. Moreover, emergency plans must adapt accordingly, as evacuation plans may differ for long-notice events. Risk transfer mechanisms, such as insurance, and public-private partnerships should be strengthened, and redevelopment should consider relocation and reinforcement of new buildings. Finally, participation by relevant stakeholders is a key concept for the management of short or no notice events, as it is a central component for efficient risk governance. All relevant stakeholders should be identified and included in decisions and their implementation, supported by good communication before, during, and after hazard events.

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science. Please check back later for the full article.

Natural hazards risk management has developed in conjunction with broader risk management theory and practice. Thus, it reflects a discourse that has characterized this field, particularly in the last decades of the 20th century. Effective implementation of natural hazards risk management strategies requires an understanding of underlying assumptions inherent to specific methodologies, as well as an explication of the process and the challenges embodied in specific approaches to risk mitigation.

Historical thinking on risk, as it has unfolded in the last few hundred years, has been exemplified by a juxtaposition between positivist and post-positivist approaches to risk that dominated the risk discourse in the late 20th century. Evolution of the general concept of risk and the progress of scientific rationality modified the relationship of people to natural hazard disasters. The epistemology, derived from a worldview that champions objective knowledge gained through observation and analysis of the predicable phenomena in the world surrounding us, has greatly contributed to this change of attitude. Notwithstanding its successes, the approach has been challenged by the complexity of natural hazard risk and by the requirement for democratic risk governance. The influence of civic movements and social scientists entering the risk management field led to the current approach, which incorporates values and value judgments into risk management decision making. The discourse that generated those changes can be interpreted as positivist vs. post-positivist, influenced by concepts of sustainability and resilience, and generating some common principles, particularly relevant for policy and planning. Examples from different countries, such as New Zealand, illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the current theory and practice of natural hazards risk management and help identify challenges for the 21st century.

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science. Please check back later for the full article.

Natural hazards have repercussions that reverberate to the political level. Their adverse socioeconomic impacts could undermine political support from key fractions in society. In democracies, voters can punish governments that do not do their utmost to ease the adverse impacts of natural hazards, which is why government responsiveness in the wake of disasters appears stronger in more pluralistic political systems.

State-of-the-art research into the political implications of natural hazards overwhelmingly suggests that voters behave retrospectively and electorally punish governments for inadequate disaster management. Natural hazards will often initially be a liability for governments due to blind voting retrospection where voters punish the incumbent government at the ballot box for any adverse impacts they encounter, regardless of whether the government is to blame or not. However, natural hazards can also be turned into an electoral advantage if dealt with appropriately due to mediated voting retrospection where voters evaluate the incumbent government based on its disaster management policies. Risk-averse governments, aware of this voting behavior, have been found to pursue proactive disaster policies, especially in highly competitive Western democracies and close to elections.

Empirical evidence that encompasses more diverse political configurations from around the world points to some caveats. Most importantly, it appears that voters are not always capable of mounting political pressure in the wake of natural hazards. Different political dynamics might be at play under diverse political regimes—the most obvious one being limited electoral pressure in more authoritarian settings. But even in situations where voters can mount a strong political pressure, it does not necessarily follow that the government will pursue effective disaster management policies. A humanitarian disaster is not necessarily a political disaster. Much depends on the symbols, images, and narratives that emerge in the wake of the natural hazard rather than its actual physical impact. The channels of impact from natural hazards on voting behavior, therefore, should also be understood as complex, indirect, and nonlinear rather than just causal, linear, and direct. Context-specific research based on narrative retrospection where voting behavior is formed by the dominant political narrative that emerges from the natural hazard appears to be a beneficial supplementary approach. More than their immediate impact, major natural hazards contain important symbolic and mythological power that could end up shaping political landscapes for years to come.

Natural hazards governance varies across Australia for two critical reasons: first, the country’s large size and latitudinal range; and second, its divided federal government structure. The first feature—the magnitude and latitudinal spread—results in a number of climatic zones, from the tropical north, through the sub-tropics, to temperate southern zones and the arid central deserts. Consequently, state and local government jurisdictions must respond to different natural hazard types and variable seasonality. In addition, the El Niño-La Niña southern oscillation cycle has a strong impact. Flooding can occur throughout the continent and is the most frequent natural hazard and most extensive in scope, although extreme heat events cause the greatest number of fatalities. In summer, cyclones frequently occur in northern Australia and severe bushfires in the southeast and southwest. Hence, governance structures and disaster response mechanisms across Australia, while sharing many similarities, of necessity vary according to hazard type in different geographical locations. Climatological hazards dominate the range and occurrence of hazard events in Australia: floods, cyclones, storms, storm surge, drought, extreme heat events, and bushfire (but local landslips and earthquakes also occur).

The second major reason for variation is that Australia has three formal levels of government (national, State, and local) with each having their own responsibilities and resources. The national government has constitutional powers only over matters of national importance or those which cross State boundaries. In terms of hazards governance, it can advise and support the states but is intimately involved only with major hazards. The six States have the principal constitutional responsibility for hazards planning, usually with a responsible State minister, and each can have a different approach. The strong vertical fiscal imbalance among the levels of government does give the national government powerful financial leverage. Local governments are the front-line hazards planning and management authorities, but because they represent local communities their approaches and capacities vary enormously. There are a number of ways in which the resultant potential for fragmentation is addressed. Regional groupings of local governments (usually assisted by the relevant state government) can work together. State governments collaborate through joint Ministerial meetings and policies. The intergovernmental Council of Australian Governments has produced a National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, which guides each state’s approach. Under these circumstances a clear national hierarchical chain of command is not possible, but serious efforts have been made to work collaboratively.

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science. Please check back later for the full article.

Natural hazards governance in Cuba has been subject to polarized discussion. While some experts explain state practices as an extension of social welfare policy, others raise concerns about forced evacuation. Disaster experts commonly forget the long-term development of disaster reduction in the country. A pragmatic analysis of the evolution of natural hazard governance in Cuba from its origins in civil defense onwards reveals the key factors for their success in protecting human life. When facing natural hazards, the country evolved from disaster recovery missions many years ago to more focus on disaster risk reduction tasks nowadays. Over time, there has been an increasing number of organizations and sections of the population involved in risk governance. Deployment of local risk management centers, nationwide multihazard risk assessment, and early warning systems are recognized as important factors for the disaster reduction effectiveness in the country. The number of scientific organizations collecting data and carrying out research in the whole process of natural hazard governance has permitted reduction of disaster impacts and increased resiliency.

Risk communication is used as a strong tool for maintaining awareness and risk perception in the population at large. The continuous development and improvement of a multilateral framework for natural hazards governance are among the key factors underlying Cuba’s risk reduction. Still, an economic crisis right after the Soviet Union collapsed and the long-lasting U.S. government blockade have been two constraints on the economic development of the country, and these constraints should be recognized as explaining large economic losses and the slow recovery after a natural hazard impact. In Cuba, we see a paradox of risk governance that protects human life but is less successful in limiting economic loss from natural hazards. Nevertheless, disaster recovery is carried out at the highest level of government commitment and management skill with the goal of reducing vulnerability as much as possible to avoid the same impact if the same hazard would affect them again. Thus, Cuba attempts to “build back better” as recommended by the United Nations Office for Natural Hazards. Despite economic losses due to natural disasters, Cuban governance of natural hazards is evaluated as a success by most organizations and experts worldwide.